

Undermining Deep Learning Based Channel Estimation via Adversarial Wireless Signal Fabrication

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ABSTRACT

Channel estimation is a crucial step in wireless communications. The estimator identifies the wireless channel distortions during the signal propagation and this information is further used for data precoding and decoding. Recent studies have shown that deep learning techniques can enhance the accuracy of conventional channel estimation algorithms. However, the reliability and security aspects of these deep learning algorithms have not yet been well investigated in the context of wireless communications. With no exceptions, channel estimation based on deep learning may be vulnerable to the adversarial machine learning attacks. However, close examination shows that we cannot simply adapt the traditional adversarial learning mechanisms to effectively manipulate channel estimation. In this paper, we propose a novel attack strategy that crafts a perturbation to fool the receiver with wrong channel estimation results. This attack is launched without knowing the current input signals and by only requiring a loose form of time synchronization. Through the over-the-air experiments with software-defined radios in our multi-user MIMO testbed, we show that the proposed strategy can effectively reduce the performance of deep learning-based channel estimation. We also demonstrate that the proposed attack can hardly be detected with the detection rate of 8% or lower.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **General and reference** → **General conference proceedings**;
• **Security and privacy** → **Mobile and wireless security**; *Access control*; • **Networks** → **Network security**; **Mobile and wireless security**; *Network reliability*; *Cyber-physical networks*.

KEYWORDS

Channel Estimation, Deep Learning, Adversarial Example, Wireless Signal, Malicious Perturbation, Generative Adversarial Network

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1 INTRODUCTION

Fast and accurate channel estimation is critical for wireless communications. As part of the communication chain, the channel estimation is needed to identify the wireless channel distortions during the signal propagation and this information is further used for data precoding and decoding. In addition, channel estimation is needed for various communication tasks (such as power control, link scheduling, and initial access) to discover and utilize the limited spectrum resources. Recent studies [1–6] have shown that deep learning techniques can enhance the accuracy of the conventional channel estimation algorithms (e.g., Least Square (LS) and Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE)). For example, both image super-resolution (SR) algorithm and denoising convolutional neural network (DnCNN) were incorporated in [1] to reduce the pilot contamination and enhance the resolution of the estimated channel. A specifically designed untrained deep neural network (DNN) estimator that can considerably improve the accuracy of the channel estimation was employed in [2] while imposing no computational overhead and temporal latency during the channel estimation.

Although deep learning has proven itself to be a capable tool in a variety of applications including wireless communications, reliability and security are major concerns regardless of the extensive usage and wide adoption of DNNs to solve complex tasks. Recent studies have shown that deep neural networks used in wireless communications are vulnerable to the adversarial machine learning attacks [7, 8]. Different wireless attacks based on adversarial machine learning include exploratory (inference) attacks [9–12], evasion (adversarial) attacks [13–25], causative (poisoning) attacks [26–29], membership inference attacks [30, 31], Trojan attacks [32], spoofing attacks [33, 34], and covert communications [35–37]. In this paper, we focus on the evasion (adversarial) attack that creates inputs containing minor perturbations, i.e., adversarial examples, to fool the DNNs to yield wrong classification results.

With no exceptions, the deep learning-based channel estimation techniques may be also vulnerable to the adversarial machine learning attacks. However, a close examination shows that we cannot simply adapt the traditional procedure of adversarial attacks to disturb the channel estimation process due to two reasons: (i) The design of the adversarial perturbation benefits from the knowledge

of the original input. However, in real-time wireless communications, it is not practical for the attackers to intercept the signal and then insert the perturbation to mislead the original results [38–40]. (ii) Unlike other data domains such as computer vision, radio signals need to be manipulated during the propagation by relying on an accurate synchronization between the victim and the attacker.

While DNNs improve the performance of the next-generation wireless networks, e.g., 5G, IoT, and multi-user MIMO (MU-MIMO), it is necessary to mitigate the optional gap between the performance gain and the security concerns. In this paper, we examine the security of the deep learning assisted wireless channel estimation and uncover potential vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we propose a novel universal adaptive signal perturbation. Instead of customizing the perturbation based on the signal inputs, the proposed attack fabricates a universal adaptive interference signal that can effectively disturb the channel estimation without requiring knowledge of the original inputs. The deep learning-based channel estimation will be used as the target victim system to test the effectiveness of the proposed attack strategy on discovering its vulnerabilities. As the channel estimation algorithms are usually public and can be utilized by any device in the network, we propose to launch attacks in the white-box scenario, in which the attacker has some knowledge of the target system. In the attack strategy, the attacker attempts to craft a perturbation to fool the receiver with wrong channel estimation results. After uncovering the potential vulnerabilities, we can further seek remedies to mitigate these security risks and improve the security guarantees for deep learning-based channel estimation systems.

After building a 2×2 MU-MIMO network testbed with software-defined radios (SDRs), we conduct the over-the-air experiments to evaluate the proposed attacks. The testbed evaluation results show that the proposed strategy can effectively disturb the deep learning assisted channel estimation such that the receiver ends up with estimating a channel that is quite different from the real one.

The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. Section 2 describes the preliminaries of the deep learning-based channel estimation. Section 3 presents the attack model that can undermine deep learning-based channel estimation via adversarial wireless signal fabrication. Section 4 demonstrates our detail attack strategies. Section 5 evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies with these experiments. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we review the channel estimation methods assisted by deep learning.

2.1 Channel-Image Based Channel Estimation

By building upon the cumulative knowledge of deep learning techniques developed for image processing and recognition, the channel information can be converted into images to take advantage of existing deep learning algorithms [1, 3, 4]. For example, the channel matrix of massive MIMO system was regarded as a 2D image in [4] and the learned denoising-based approximate message passing (LDAMP) neural network was applied into the iterative sparse signal recovery algorithm for channel estimation. Both image super-resolution (SR) algorithm and image restoration (IR) method

were incorporated in [1] to eliminate the effects of channel noise and enhance the resolution of the estimated channel. This design also utilized the denoising convolutional neural network (DnCNN) to improve both the training time and accuracy.

2.2 Channel Estimation with Untrained Deep Neural Network

Traditional channel estimators such as matrix inversion and singular value decomposition (SVD) are impractically complex for large channel matrices [41–45]. Recently, multiple unsupervised machine learning models [2, 5, 6, 41, 43] have been proposed to achieve low-overhead, low-complexity, and scalable channel estimators. As conventional DNNs usually require a large number of labeled datasets for model training and parameter tuning, they are not suitable for channel estimation in a rapid changing wireless environment. In particular, inspired by recently proposed DNN design named deep image prior [46], which is used for denoising and inpainting, and require no training efforts, [2] applied a specifically designed deep image prior to removing the channel noise and reducing the preamble contamination before forwarding the received signals for the least-square estimation. The untrained DNN estimator was shown to improve the accuracy of the channel estimation considerably while imposing no computational overhead and temporal latency during the procedure.

In addition to the above two main types of deep learning methods, many specified/customized deep learning models have been developed to achieve efficient and accurate channel estimation [44, 47–49]. We describe the typical deep learning-based channel estimation designs in the following.

2.3 DeepMux for Downlink Channel Estimation

A deep learning model called DeepMux was proposed in [47] to achieve efficient downlink MU-MIMO-OFDMA transmission for 802.11ax networks. DeepMux employs a deep learning-based channel sounding module to reduce the airtime overhead of 802.11 protocols. Channel sounding is the critical step for signal beamforming in downlink MU-MIMO networks. However, current protocols may incur a high time overhead and essentially reduce the system throughput. The channel sounding module in DeepMux employs an online training process and requires no effort from stations. This design infers full CSI angles based on a sparsified feedback and can significantly reduce the channel sounding overhead.

2.4 Deep Learning Channel Estimation for Short Pilots

In the massive MIMO network, a large-scale antenna array is usually deployed to achieve considerable antenna gains. Nevertheless, the antenna gains highly depend on the accuracy of the channel estimation. Common channel estimation usually assumes the pilot length is equal to or larger than the number of transmit antennas to achieve an accurate channel estimate. As the number of transmit antennas keeps increasing, this assumption may not always hold. A two-stage machine learning-based channel estimation system was developed in [4]. First, a two-layer neural network (TNN) was constructed to minimize the mean square error (MSE) of the channel estimation. Second, a DNN based iterative channel estimation




Figure 1: The attack model.

technique was adopted to further improve the channel estimation performance.

2.5 LSTM-Based Channel Estimation for Imperfect Channel State Information (CSI)

Because of the processing and transmission delay, the channel state information (CSI) estimated at the receiver is not always perfect in a practical mobile network. Some accurate channel estimation method was developed in [44] for multi-user massive MIMO-enabled vehicular communication networks. Specifically, LSTM was utilized to capture the time correlation characteristics among consistent received signals and apply the learned characteristics to compensate the imperfection of the channel estimation, thus gaining an accurate CSI.

3 ATTACK MODEL

Deep learning-based channel estimation techniques can provide promising performance and computation efficiency for wireless communications. However, the security and reliability of these techniques have not been thoroughly examined. In particular, it is known that deep learning models are usually vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e., a small perturbation inserted to the inputs may fool a deep learning model with a misclassified output. It is possible that machine learning-based channel estimation in wireless communications may also be significantly disrupted by the adversarial perturbations. Therefore, it is essential to understand the impact of adversarial machine learning attack on deep learning-based channel estimation techniques, and seek means to alleviate these security risks.

To this end, we aim to exploit the vulnerabilities of deep learning-based channel estimation and seek feasible adversarial machine learning attacks on wireless communications. The channel estimation system is used as the target victim system to test the effectiveness of the proposed attack strategy. As shown in Figure 1, the target channel estimation system consists of a base station (e.g., gNodeB), a wireless channel, and a receiver (e.g., user equipment). At the transmitter side, the base station sends pilot signals (i.e., training sequence) to the receiver for channel synchronization. The objective of the attacker is to add a malicious perturbation signal through the channel between the base station and the receiver such

that the machine learning model is manipulated to yield an incorrect channel estimation result and further affect the data decoding at the receiver.

We assume a white-box attack as the channel estimation algorithms are usually public and can be utilized by any device in the network. However, it is a challenge for the attacker to obtain the fine-grained time synchronization of the transmitter. We also assume the perturbation generated by the attacker is subject to a random phase shift on the channel relative to the transmitter's signal. In the next section, we will introduce the details on how to generate the adversarial perturbation to achieve the attack goals.

4 PERTURBATION GENERATION

4.1 Problem Formulation

Since channel estimation algorithms are usually public and can be adopted by any wireless device, we assume the machine learning model used for the channel estimation has already been learned by the attacker. The attacker aims to fabricate a perturbation signal Δs that can disturb the channel estimation results. The goal of the attack is to yield

$$M(s + \Delta s) \neq M(s), \quad (1)$$

where s is the received signal and M is the underlying machine learning model used for channel estimation. The output of M is the channel estimation result. The attacker aims to create a signal perturbation such that the system will obtain a different output result.

This attack formulation falls into the general area of adversarial machine learning. However, a close examination shows that we cannot simply adapt the traditional adversarial machine learning approach to launch the proposed attack.

- (i) For traditional adversarial perturbation problem, we need to have the knowledge of the original input. Upon that, we create a customized perturbation to skew the output result. However, as wireless communication operates in real time, it is almost impossible for attackers to first intercept the signal, predict the results, and then add the perturbation to mislead the results. The delay introduced during the procedure creates a substantial hurdle to launch a realistic attack.
- (ii) Unlike images or videos, it would be a challenging task to manipulate a radio signal during the propagation. The attack would benefit from an accurate synchronization to add the interference signal to the original signal.

In this paper, we propose a novel attack that does not rely on the knowledge of current input signals and requires a loose time synchronization only.

4.2 Attack Overview

Intuitively, we can create a jamming signal with large power to overwhelm the original signal at the receiver. However, such trivial attacks can be easily detected when the system experiences unexpected larger signal power of the received signals. In addition, the attacker may need to preserve its energy (e.g., when it is battery powered). Towards this end, we propose a novel universal adaptive signal perturbation. Instead of customizing the perturbation based

on the signal inputs, the proposed attack fabricates a universal adaptive interference signal that can effectively disturb the channel estimation without requiring knowledge of the original inputs. In addition, the attacker can hide itself by keeping the interference signal within the normal power constraints. In particular, we can further formulate the attack as

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\Delta s} & \|\Delta s\|^2 \\ \text{s.t. } & M(s + \Delta s) \neq M(s) \text{ for any } s \in \mathcal{S}, \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $\mathcal{S}$ is the original transmit signal. In this attack formulation, we aim to find an interference signal Δs that can yield different channel estimations for any possible signal s belonging to the system. We also observe that channel estimation is performed in the unit of each symbol. Inspired by that, the proposed attack does not focus on an exact time synchronization to achieve fine-grained signal manipulation. Alternatively, we only require symbol-level synchronization to systematically disturb the channel estimation. For a wireless system with 10 MHz bandwidth, the attack can achieve the system-level time synchronization as long as the oscillator of the system can generate a signal of the resolution within $0.1\mu s$, which can be easily achieved by most modern radio transceivers [50].

Figure 2 demonstrates the structure of the proposed signal perturbation. It includes three components:

- (i) Perturbation randomizer that generates a random initial variable for dynamic perturbation generation.
- (ii) Perturbation generator that builds an adversarial model and generates signal perturbations to manipulate the channel estimation.
- (iii) Gaussian normalizer that enforces the Gaussian distribution of the signal perturbation to avoid being detected by the communication system.

In what follows, we first describe how we generate random perturbations to manipulate the channel estimation. Then, we demonstrate how to further refine the perturbation to circumvent statistical examination by the network administrator and achieve a stealthy attack.




Figure 2: Structure of the adversarial perturbation generation.

4.3 Symbol-level Signal Perturbation

The attacker aims to generate a universal perturbation signal Δs to yield different channel estimation results at the receiver. Although we may craft a fixed signal Δs by solving the optimization question in 2, the fixed pattern may be easily learned and removed by the receiver from the transmit signals to avoid the disturbance. In addition, current solutions based on solving 2 does not consider the impact of channel distortions when the signal perturbation is sent to the receiver.

Randomizing the perturbation: To improve the stealthiness of the proposed attack, we aim to introduce randomness to the universal perturbation. In particular, we further define the perturbation signal as a function of $\Delta d(t)$, where Δd indicates each perturbation symbol. It takes a random variable t as input and generates different perturbation symbols accordingly. Specifically, we can refine 2 as

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\Delta d(t)} & f_l(M(d + \Delta d(t)), M(d)) \text{ for any } d \in \mathcal{D}, \\ \text{s.t. } & |\Delta d(t)|^2 \leq p_{th}, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where d indicates a possible transmit symbol, f_l is the loss function of the model M , p_{th} is the power constraint of the perturbation symbol, and $\mathcal{D}$ is the set of all possible symbols. In this attack formulation, we aim to obtain $\Delta d(t)$ to maximize the difference of the loss function between the original channel estimation and the manipulated one, while satisfying a small power constraint of p_{th} .

Dealing with the channel distortion: So far, our discussion has omitted the channel distortion between the attacker and the receiver to facilitate the analysis. However, the distortion may considerably affect the amplitude and phase of the perturbation signal $\Delta d(t)$, resulting in an ineffective attack. Due to this reason, channel distortion must be pre-compensated before $\Delta d(t)$ is transmitted. In particular, the attacker can passively sniff the acknowledgement packets from the receiver and estimate the channel h_a with the receiver. Without loss of generality, we model the estimated channel h_a as a complex coefficient and assume that the channel will remain constant during the perturbation signal transmission. Then, the perturbation signal is precoded according to the estimated channel to compensate the propagation loss (i.e., the precoded perturbation signals are computed as $\Delta d(t)' = \Delta d(t)/h_a$).

4.4 Gaussian Normalizer

We further randomize the perturbation to emulate it as true channel noise. In particular, current output of $\Delta d(t)$ may not always follow regular channel noise distributions (e.g., Gaussian noise). If the system statistically examines the received signals, it may detect the unusual patterns of the signal perturbation and identify the attack. To further improve the effectiveness of the proposed attack, we enforce the Gaussian distribution on the perturbation signal. In particular, we add a Gaussian operator $G(y)$ during the attack training to track the generated perturbations and ensure that the output of the objective function always follows the Gaussian distribution.

5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

We set up 2×2 MU-MIMO OFDM network by utilizing Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) radios as the SDRs. Our testbed

is running at the central frequency of 2.4GHz. In this section, we present results based on the over-the-air experiments conducted in this testbed.

We consider three typical deep learning assisted channel estimation methods in our experiments.

- (i) **LDAMP based channel estimation:** This method takes advantage of LDAMP neural network to remove the channel noise and adopts the iterative sparse signal recovery algorithm to estimate the channel.
- (ii) **DIP based channel estimation:** This method adopts the untrained deep image prior model to improve both training efficiency and accuracy.
- (iii) **LSTM based channel estimation:** This method utilizes the LSTM to learn the temporal correlations among continuous received signals to improve the estimation accuracy.

We run each algorithm for 1000 times with and without the proposed attack. In addition, we assume a static environment such that channels are estimated within the coherence time.

5.1 Effectiveness of the Proposed Attack

We define the channel distance d to indicate the effectiveness of the proposed attack, where the distance d_{ij} between two estimated channels h_i and h_j is computed as $|h_i - h_j|$. Within the coherence time, channels estimated at the receiver should be constant with minor distance.




Figure 3: Effectiveness of the proposed attacks. LDAMP+, DIP+, LSTM+ indicate results under attack.

Figure 3 shows the results of different channel estimation methods under the attack. In particular, we plot the distribution of estimated channel distances. When there is no attack (curves labeled as LDAMP, DIP, LSTM), all the algorithms can achieve constant estimations, and the channel distances for them are quite small (i.e., 80% of channel distances are less than 0.01). Meanwhile, when the attack is present (curves labeled as LDAMP+, DIP+, LSTM+), the estimation results become quite different and cannot achieve consistency (i.e., channel distances for all three algorithms are larger than 0.5 under the proposed attack).

5.2 Stealthiness of the Proposed Attack

We also evaluate the Stealthiness (undetectability) of the proposed attack. We find that the receiver can easily detect the attack when random variable t is not employed, because the receiver experiences a fixed power increment of the received signal. When t is applied without Gaussian normalizer, the receiver can still detect the attack by analyzing the noise distribution (i.e., $\Delta d(t)$ follows an approximately uniform distribution). When Gaussian normalizer is applied, statistical analysis becomes invalid to detect the attack. Figure 4 shows the detection rate when Gaussian normalizer has been deployed. Since the randomized perturbation now behaves as the normal Gaussian noise, the receiver can hardly detect the attacks and the detection rate drops to 8% or lower.




Figure 4: Detection rate with Gaussian normalizer

6 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we considered deep learning-based channel estimation and exploited their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. In particular, we developed a novel attack that does not rely on the knowledge of current input signals and requires only a loose time synchronization. The attacker's goal is to craft a perturbation that fools the receiver with wrong channel estimation results without being detected by the receiver. In addition, we built a 2×2 MU-MIMO network with SDRs and conducted the over-the-air experiments to evaluate the proposed attack. The experiment results show that the proposed attack can effectively manipulate the deep learning-based channel estimation such that the receiver is fooled into estimating a channel that is quite different from the real one.

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